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Infinite
Conversation
Robert S. Lehman
Continental Divide:
Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos
by Peter E. Gordon. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press,
2010. Pp. 448. $39.95 cloth.
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The public debate that took place
between Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945)
and Martin Heidegger (1889–1976)
in the spring of 1929 at the second
annual Internationale Davoser
Hochschulkurse in Davos, Switzerland, is remembered by scholars of
twentieth-century culture not only
for the light that it sheds on these
figures’ opposed philosophical positions but also as an indication of
the path that European philosophy—and, more controversially,
European politics—would follow
in the years to come. Cassirer, an
assimilated Jew and staunch supporter of the Weimar Republic,
had studied under the neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen and made a
name for himself both as an historian of philosophy and as a formidable philosopher of science. The
younger Heidegger, whose Being
and Time had been published a few
years earlier (1927), had broken
from the transcendental phenomenology of his mentor, Edmund
Husserl, and was now viewed as a
representative of the “new philosophy,” as a champion of life and the
irrational opposed to attempts to
codify philosophy as a rigorous science. A few years after the debate,
concurrent with the rise of Nazism, Cassirer would leave his post
in Hamburg and move to England,
then Sweden, before settling in the
United States. Heidegger, to whom
hindsight has tended to award victory in the debate, would assume
the rectorship at the University of
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Freiburg (though he would resign
just a year later) and join the Nazi
Party. Both philosophers would
remain productive into their final
years, though with time the incommensurability of their respective
positions would only become more
pronounced.
In his exciting new study, Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer,
Davos, the intellectual historian
Peter E. Gordon attempts to separate the philosophical kernel of the
Davos debate—ostensibly, the correct interpretation of Immanuel
Kant’s critical philosophy—from
its political shell. Indeed, Gordon’s
claim that what occurred between
Cassirer and Heidegger was above
all a philosophical conversation
ought to be read as a challenge to
the more politically charged analyses of the same event developed by,
among others, Hans Blumenberg,
Pierre Bourdieu, and Geoff Waite.
This is not to say that politics plays
no role in Continental Divide. Gordon is quick to admit that the afterlife of the Davos debate has been
decidedly extraphilosophical. But,
he notes, the danger of an allegorical interpretation of this event is
that “by dissolving the philosophical into the political, it threatens to
divest us of any remaining criteria
by which to decide intellectual debate other than the anti-intellectual contingencies of sheer power”
(357). By reducing philosophy to
politics, Gordon avers, we sacrifice
the ability to ground our political
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choices in anything other than
force. His opposed strategy is to locate the exchange between Cassirer
and Heidegger in an intellectualhistorical force field that includes
neo-Kantianism and phenomenology, existentialism and vitalism, all
the while stressing that the heart
of the debate remained a clash between two incompatible readings of
Kant’s project. When Cassirer and
Heidegger’s respective positions are
grasped on their own terms, as well
as in relation to the wider situation
of Weimar-era philosophy, Gordon
wagers, we will finally begin to understand why a relatively specialized discussion came to be treated
as a critical juncture in both the
intra- and the extraphilosophical
culture of Europe.
In the first chapter of the book,
Gordon provides a summary analysis of the intellectual climate during the years of the Weimar Republic. Though the title of this chapter,
“Philosophy in Crisis,” points synechdocally to the wider transformations occurring in Germany at
the time, the core of the crisis that
Gordon describes is the usurpation
of neo-Kantianism as Continental
Europe’s dominant philosophy. In
brief, neo-Kantianism, especially
in the form given to it by the Marburg School philosopher Hermann
Cohen, sought to downplay the
metaphysical dimension of Kant’s
work in favor of the epistemological dimension. The result of
this endeavor was a reconfigured
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Kantianism qua logic of scientific
knowledge, for which the more
mysterious dimensions of Kant’s
project—the pure spatiotemporal
forms of intuition, as well as the
thing-in-itself—were either reduced to logical operations or eliminated altogether. Though Cassirer
retained the essentially neo-Kantian faith in human consciousness
as a spontaneous faculty that “constituted and animated” the world
of experience (86), Gordon writes,
he nonetheless “modified the basic
character of neo-Kantianism almost to the breaking point” (84),
moving from the analysis of natural
science to the symbolic operations
basic to human culture. Heidegger,
too, came of age in the milieu of
neo-Kantianism, and though his
reading of the Critique of Pure
Reason (1781) was diametrically
opposed to the reading set forth by
the neo-Kantians, he continued to
associate himself with Kant’s project. Where Cohen and, after him,
Cassirer looked to Kant’s philosophy as a means of setting science (in
the broader German sense of Wissenschaft) on a secure intellectual
ground, Heidegger read Kant as a
metaphysician, as a Heideggerian
ontologist avant la lettre whose
project reached its apogee in a radical thinking of human finitude.
Gordon’s rejection of political interpretation and his translation of the respective positions of
Cassirer and Heidegger into the
common language of Kantianism

dovetails suggestively with the
professed aim of the Davos Hochschule during its four years of existence (1928–31): to heal through
philosophical conversation the
political wounds inflicted by the
Great War. As Gordon notes in
the second chapter, “Setting the
Stage,” the standing of the Hochschule was secured already in its
first year, when it counted among
its guests Albert Einstein, who
both lectured on the theory of
relativity and performed on the
violin. In 1929, the theme of the
conference, Was ist der Mensch?
(What is the human being?), was
intended as general enough to be
open to a variety of philosophical approaches while still gesturing more or less explicitly to the
work of Kant (who had suggested
in his Jäsche Logic (1800) that the
central questions of critical philosophy come together in the “anthropological” question “What
is man?”). It succeeded in its cosmopolitan mission insofar as it
welcomed not just Heidegger and
Cassirer but future greats such as
Ludwig Binswanger, Jean Cavaillès, Eugen Fink, Maurice de Gandillac, Emmanuel Lévinas, and
Joachim Ritter.
Chapters 3 and 4 of Continental
Divide culminate in a retranslation
of the debate in its entirety, supplemented by Gordon’s copious explanatory notes. Though Gordon
takes the opportunity to reaffirm
that the debate hinged on opposed
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readings of Kant’s project in terms
of either spontaneity (Cassirer) or
finitude/thrownness (Heidegger),
he also acknowledges that it soon
became clear that “the Kant interpretation Heidegger presented at
Davos served as merely a pretext
for expounding his own philosophy” (161). It is with this in mind
that we might read the intervention
in the debate by the Dutch linguist
Hendrik Pos, an audience member sympathetic to Cassirer’s project and the only figure other than
Cassirer and Heidegger to speak.
“Both men speak a completely different language,” Pos observed, and
“it is a matter of extracting something common from these two languages” (189). The establishment of
a common language seems to have
been a hope shared by Cassirer,
as well as by the organizers of the
Hochschule, and, as I’ve already
noted, it is also more or less explicitly Gordon’s aim in Continental
Divide. For Heidegger, however,
who would later reflect on the ontological significance of polemos, a
common language seems to have
been less important. In fact, near
the end of the debate, Heidegger
stated straightforwardly that “what
I describe by Dasein does not allow
translation into a concept of Cassirer’s” (195). It is worth noting
this issue of translatability because,
despite Gordon’s very evenhanded
treatment of Cassirer’s and Heidegger’s respective positions, the
viability of Continental Divide’s
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method hinges on the availability
of something like the common language projected by Cassirer, Pos,
and the organizers of the Hochschule. We will return to this point
in a moment.
The end of the debate takes us
only a little beyond the midpoint
of Continental Divide. Gordon
uses the second half of the book to
“break from history and . . . pause
to consider some of the deeper and
conceptual issues at stake in the
debate” (215). This interruption
allows him to treat the positions
of the participants in greater detail
and, most interestingly, to interpret
Cassirer’s and Heidegger’s postDavos writings in light of some of
the issues that arose in 1929. For
example, Gordon quite convincingly reads some of Cassirer’s late
texts, the much-celebrated Philosophy of Enlightenment (1932) and
the posthumously published Myth
of the State (1946), as two defenses
of rationality against the perceived
irrationalism embodied by Heidegger. In the latter text, written
during his brief term in the philosophy department at Columbia,
Cassirer finally took the opportunity to reflect on the specifically
political significance of Heidegger’s
project, ultimately condemning it
as a symptom of “the return of fatalism in our modern world” (310).
Heidegger, on the other hand,
never really took the time to engage with Cassirer’s thought after
their Davos encounter; his further
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philosophical studies led him out of
Cassirer’s ambit, backward in time
before Kant to the pre-Socratics. A
real dialogue with Cassirer became
impossible.
In the last chapter of Continental Divide, on “Philosophy and
Memory,” Gordon interrogates the
reappearance of the Davos debate
in contemporary thought, not as a
philosophical conversation but as a
cultural-political allegory. In allegorical renderings of the encounter
between Cassirer and Heidegger,
the smallest details take on grand
significance. Gordon thus dedicates
a brief section to Pos’s recollection
that, at the end of the debate, Heidegger refused to shake Cassirer’s
hand. If it happened, this slight
would have at least indicated Heidegger’s lack of manners. More
seriously, it could also substantiate
charges of anti-Semitism. No one
but Pos claims to have witnessed
this incident, and Gordon is rightly
skeptical that it ever happened.
Nonetheless, in a 1945 discussion
of the debate, Heidegger remarked
that “he had not hesitated ‘to shake
publicly the hand of the Jew Cassirer’” (340). Heidegger’s questionable defense of his behavior suggests that the disputed handshake
was, at any rate, on his mind.
Gordon leaves the question of the
handshake unresolved, letting it
stand as evidence of the weight retroactively afforded to each of the
debate’s (non)events.

In the last pages of his study,
Gordon makes some of his most
contentious claims about the relationship of politics to philosophy,
writing that “the ultimate tragedy
of the Davos encounter is not that
it ended in victory for politics of
the wrong kind. The deeper tragedy is that it ended in politics at all”
(357). Obviously, this remark warrants further reflection. Gordon’s
claim, as I noted earlier, is that the
reduction of philosophical disputes
to their political subtexts results in
the sacrifice of rational standards
for adjudicating these disputes. In
the absence of these standards, la
force fait loi. And yet, Gordon’s
turn to a philosophical metalanguage—in this case, the language
of Kantianism—as a response to
the threat of a political overreading
is not entirely satisfying. Indeed,
Gordon’s need to demonstrate
that a philosophical conversation
(rather than a political struggle)
took place at Davos occasionally
results in a somewhat narrow reading of Heidegger in particular. The
latter becomes more of a Kantian
(and, thus, less of a Husserlian,
Diltheyan, Kierkegaardian, or
Aristotelian) than he really was so
as to appear closer to the Kantian
Cassirer. Is it possible, one might
wonder, to accept that the core of
the Davos debate was philosophical while denying that Cassirer and
Heidegger were ever speaking the
same language? A larger question
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is whether belief in the autonomy
of philosophy vis-à-vis politics necessarily entails the belief that all
philosophical disputes can be, philosophically, resolved.
No doubt such questions are
bound to arise in any attempt to
deal with the work of a figure so
controversial as Heidegger, and
Gordon’s book has much to recommend it. In addition to wonderfully
clear treatments of Cassirer’s and
Heidegger’s philosophies, particularly as they dovetail with Kantianism, Continental Divide is packed
with anecdotes, which range from
Heidegger’s high opinion of his
own abilities as a skier to Emmanuel Lévinas’s guilty recollection of
his mocking portrayal of Cassirer
in a comical restaging of the debate.
Perhaps these small flourishes interest Gordon less than the fundamental questions of philosophy, but
they make his book not only informative but a pleasure to read.
Robert S. Lehman recently completed his
doctorate in the Department of English at
Cornell University. His writings on modernism and philosophy have appeared or are
forthcoming in Theory & Event, New Literary History, Journal of Modern Literature,
Angelaki, and diacritics. He is currently
completing a book entitled “The Impossibility of Being Modern.”
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